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Abstract: The purpose of this dissertation is to examine in a succinct way the issue of 
transparency in investor-State arbitration proceedings. In order to address the main aspects 
of the concept the paper is separated into four sections. Section I includes an introduction to 
the issue highlighting the differences between commercial and investment arbitration and 
delineating the concept of public interest. In section II there is an overview of the current 
normative framework followed by an analysis of the most commonly used procedural rules in 
investor-State disputes on each stage of the proceedings and in regard to relevant orders and 
decisions of arbitral tribunals in the most important cases. There is also an outline of the 
most significant concerns that have been raised against increased transparency. In section III 
a look towards the forthcoming normative framework between the two sides of the Atlantic 
and in particular the concerns that are raised on transparency issues about the two major 
agreements that the European Union is intended to conclude with Canada and the United 
States of America.  
 
      I Introduction 
Transparency has received and continues to gain significant attention in international, 
regional and national legal regimes. However, transparency is a notion that cannot be easily 
defined since it can have different contexts depending on the field of law that is related to1. 
From the perspective of international investment law transparency could be defined as: “The 
adequacy, accuracy, availability, and accessibility of knowledge and information about the 
policies and activities of (the international investment law regime and its participants), and of 
the central organizations (functioning within) it on matters relevant to compliance and 
effectiveness, and about the operation of the norms, rules, and procedures (underlying the 
regime)”2. 
 
      The importance of transparency in International Investment Arbitration 
 Since international investment disputes are predominantly resolved by arbitral tribunals 
instead of State court proceedings3 many commentators focus on transparency in international 
investment arbitration. The first question that arises is why transparency is so important in 
investor-State disputes. The question could be better answered by examining the special 
characteristics of investment disputes in comparison to regular commercial arbitration 
disputes. According to prominent representatives of the transparency movement: “Arbitration 
brought by an investor against a State differs significantly from commercial arbitration that 
concerns only private parties implicating the public interest in ways the latter do not, a fact 
that is now widely acknowledged within the international investment arbitration community 
… the existence of this public interest has implications for the conduct of the arbitration 
                                                          
1 Carl-Sebastian Zoellner,  Transparency an Analysis of an Evolving Fundamental Principal in 
International Economic Law p. 580-581 
2 Juile A. Maupin, Transparency in International investment Law: The Good, the Bad and the Murky 
p.6  based on a definition originally suggested by Chayes, Chayes and Mitchel in managing compliance 
: a comparative perspective 
3See also United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) IIA Issues Note Recent 
Developments in Investor State Dispute Settlement p.4 available at: 
http://unctad.org/en/publicationslibrary/webdiaepcb2014d3_en.pdf 
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which means that according to principles of human rights law and good governance, 
government activities should be subject to basic requirements of transparency and public 
participation”4. Thus, the main argument of the transparency movement is that since there is a 
public interest in investment arbitration, proceedings must become more transparent through 
greater access to documents and to the arbitration process itself 5 . In addition, unlike 
commercial disputes investor-State arbitration may involve significant monetary liability for 
public treasuries since awards often order states to compensate foreign investors directly 
affecting their budget 6 . Therefore, the public’s concern is justified on the basis that 
investment arbitration proceedings may have an adverse effect to the State’s financial 
situation because of a possible monetary award that will eventually be paid out of the public’s 
tax revenues7.  
 Furthermore, investment arbitration disputes involving public interest considerations often 
raise democratic concerns. Indeed, the secretive nature of arbitration has received strong 
criticism as incompatible with the “rule of law”, especially in democratic societies where the 
resolution of disputes involving issues of public nature demands that citizens and the press 
have access to the information relating to public affairs8. Some commentators arguably note 
that investor-State disputes contribute to the problem of the democratic deficit since 
arbitrators without being elected or appointed, are considered to interfere with regulations 
promulgated by the elected officials of the people that are meant to protect the welfare of the 
State’s citizens and nationals9. The problem is more intense in developing or less democratic 
nations where there is an additional reason for governments to be accountable to their 
electorate and come under scrutiny in the political process if they are engaged in conduct 
contrary to their international obligations10. Transparency’s role is thus crucial to a State’s 
democratic function and the promotion of good governance. 
 
     The concept of public interest 
It is evident that public interest is one of the main features of investment disputes that 
distinguish them from commercial ones. On a theoretical level, public interest can refer on the 
one hand to the interest of a State and its constituents and on the other hand matters that 
encompass the common interests of mankind such as environmental concerns and human 
rights11. However, the relevant legal provisions do not make any direct reference to the term 
12. Thus, the concept has been elaborated by arbitral tribunals in a number of significant 
investment disputes. In Methanex v United States of America dispute, the tribunal held that 
                                                          
4 Center of for International Environmental Law and International Institute for Sustainable 
development, revising the UNCITRAL Arbitration rules to address State arbitrations p.3 available at: 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/investment_revising_uncitral_arbitration.pdf  
5 Ruth Teitelbaum, a Look at the Public Interest in Investment Arbitration: Is it Unique? What should 
we do about it? p.55 
6 Ibid.  
7 Barnali Choudhury, Recapturing Public Power: Is Investment Arbitration’s Engagement of the Public 
Interest Contributing to the Democratic Deficit? p.809 
8 Marcos A. Orellana, The right of Access to Information and Investment Arbitration p.61 
9 Choudhury p.782 
10 Nigel Blackaby, Public Interest and Investment Treaty Arbitration p.360 
11 Choudhury p.791 
12 see supra note 78 
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“there is an undoubtedly public interest in this arbitration. The substantive issues extend far 
beyond those raised by the usual transnational arbitration between commercial parties. This is 
not merely because one of the Disputing Parties is a State: there are of course disputes 
involving States which are of no greater general public interest than a dispute between private 
persons. The public interest in this arbitration arises from its subject-matter, as powerfully 
suggested in the Petitions”13.  
In the Suez-Vivendi v Argentine Republic case, the tribunal highlighted that “The factor 
that gives this case particular public interest is that the investment dispute centers around the 
water distribution and sewage systems of a larger metropolitan area, the City of Buenos Aires 
and surrounding municipalities. Those systems provide basic public services to millions of 
people and as a result may raise a variety of complex public and international law questions, 
including human rights considerations. Any decision rendered in this case, whether in favor of 
the Claimants or the Respondent, has the potential to affect the operation of those systems and 
thereby the public they serve” 14. Thus, the Suez tribunal did set the main requirements for a 
dispute to concern public interest without however any indication that these elements 
constitute an exclusive list leaving it open for a future tribunal determine the existence of 
public interest based on different criteria15. One year later, in the case Aguas Provinciales de 
Santa Fe the tribunal provided a more comprehensive definition according to which third 
party intervention has been accepted by courts in cases that involve issues of public interest 
“because decisions in those cases have the potential, directly or indirectly, to affect persons 
beyond those immediately involved as parties in the case”. Following a similar approach to 
Suez-Vivendi the tribunal emphasized that “The factor that gives this case particular public 
interest is that the investment dispute centers around the water distribution and sewage 
systems of urban areas in the province of Santa Fe. Those systems provide basic public 
services to hundreds of thousands of people and as a result may raise a variety of complex 
public and international law questions, including human rights considerations. Any decision 
rendered in this case, whether in favor of the Claimants or the Respondent, has the potential 
to affect the operation of those systems and thereby the public they serve” 16.  
These cases apart for other reasons are helpful in what they shed light in an otherwise 
vague concept. The conditions however are quite broad since matters that concern vital 
services such as water, electricity and other significant infrastructure problems are likely to be 
met in most investor-State disputes17. In addition public interest is not necessarily attached to 
investment disputes only. It could be argued that commercial arbitrations involving States or 
State entities may equally involve essential matters of public policy having an impact to 
                                                          
13 Methanex corporation v United States of America - decision on petitions from third persons to 
intervene as amici cuariae par.49 
14 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and Vivendi universal S.A. v Argentine Republic 
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19 - Order in Response to a Petition for Transparency and Participation as 
Amicus Curiae of May 19, 2005 par.19 
15 Epaminontas E. Triantafilou, Is a Connection to the “Public Interest” a Meaningful Prerequisite of 
Third Party Participation in Investment Arbitration p.41 
16 Aguas Provinciales de Santa Fe S.A, Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A, and 
Interaguas Servicios Intergrales del Agua S.A. v the Argentine Republic ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17 Fe -
order in response to a petition for participation as amicus curiae par.18 
17 Epaminontas E.Triantafilou p.43 
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public liabilities and raising a State’s international obligations 18 .Therefore the issue of 
transparency should be dealt in a more general framework taking into account that the 
involvement of a State or a State entity in a dispute may by itself give rise to public interest 
concerns even if the claim is based on a private contract19.  
 
 
     II An Overview of Transparency in International Investment Arbitration 
 
     The existing normative framework 
Arbitration is now the most commonly used method to resolve international investment 
disputes 20 . Arbitral tribunals however do not resolve investment disputes on their own 
initiative; instead they draw their jurisdictional powers from a number of different regional, 
sectoral and bilateral regimes. Currently it is estimated that the overall number of concluded 
international investment agreements (IIAs) including bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and 
other forms of IIAs such as regional trade agreements (RTAs) exceeds 3.00021. On the basis 
of this complicated framework, there is an ever-increasing number of BITs. Historically, 
international investors were concerned about being subject to arbitrary and discriminatory 
treatment by developing-countries, leading numerous governments that seek to attract foreign 
investments to enter into agreements that incorporate standards of protection for foreign 
investors22. These agreements evolved to guarantee the investor a series of substantive rights, 
such as national treatment, fair and equitable treatment, most-favored-nation treatment, and 
fair expropriation, as well as access to dispute resolution mechanisms, such as international 
arbitration, for resolving disputes that may arise from the investment23. Therefore, the main 
objective of a BIT is to minimize the risks taken with an investment by giving the right to the 
investor to file against a possibly harmful action from a foreign government and thus 
eventually increase foreign direct investment between the two States 24 . Since their first 
appearance in the late 1950’s with the first agreement concluded between Germany and 
Pakistan, the use of BITs has grown rapidly and currently they are widely used throughout the 
investment world25.  
Some of these BITs, especially the more recent ones, address directly the issue of 
transparency in the arbitral process allowing open hearings, public access to documents and 
                                                          
18Jan Heiner Nedden, Friedrich Rosenfeld, The new UNCITRAL Transparency rules: How the Trend 
Towards Transparency Differs in Investment and Commercial Arbitration p.61 -62, Teitelbaum p.56 
19 Ibid.  
20 See also : UNCTAD IIA issues note recent developments in ISDS available in 
http://unctad.org/SearchCenter/Pages/Results.aspx?k=isds 
21See also : http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA 
22 Eugenia Levine, Amicus Curiae in International Investment Arbitration: The Implications of an 
Increase in Third Party Participation p.202  
23 Katia Fach Gómez, Rethinking the Role of Amicus Curiae in International Investment Arbitration: 
How to Draw the Line Favorably for Public Interest  p.524-525 
24 Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Zachary C Steinert-Threlkeld  and David G. Victor, Transparency of 
Investor-State Arbitration Transparency in Arbitration p.3 
25 Katia Fach Gómez p.524 
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third party participation in the proceedings. For example both, the U.S. Model BIT and the 
Canadian Model Foreign Investment and Promotion Agreement (“Model FIPA”) provide for 
transparent proceedings26. In addition to the bilateral regimes, there are multilateral treaties 
containing substantive rules on foreign investment, such as the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) which addresses both matters of trade and investment, as well as sector-
specific arrangements, such as the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), that provide for investor-
State arbitral proceedings27. Again the level of transparency among these agreements varies. 
NAFTA was indeed an innovative agreement when concluded the text however is remarkably 
silent regarding transparency with the only reference being in Article 1137(4) which allows 
the investor of the host state to publish an award if they are a disputing party28. Due to this 
fact the NAFTA Free Trade Commission (FTC) has played a key role in promoting 
transparency through the interpretation of NAFTA provisions29 with recommendations that 
are binding for arbitral tribunals and reflect the general approach that they have already taken 
towards this direction in many cases30. In regard to transparency, some of the most liberal 
provisions are contained in Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement 
(DR-CAFTA). Incorporating the language of the U.S. model BIT, DR-CAFTA adopts a 
transparent and open process which allows third party participation by written submissions31. 
Furthermore, Article 10.21 requires tribunals to open proceedings to the public and make 
available all written submissions32 establishing a regime that promotes maximum openness 
compared to other multi-lateral frameworks.  
 
      The predominant rules in International Investment Arbitration 
 International investment agreements whether bilateral or multilateral usually give the 
discretion to the disputing parties to choose between a variety of institutional and ad-hoc 
arbitration rules. According to NAFTA Chapter 1133 for example, investors can choose to 
conduct the proceedings under the institutional regime of the International Center for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ISCID) choosing ICSID Arbitration Rules (ICSID 
Rules)34 , ICSID Additional Facility Rules, or under the Arbitration Rules of the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules)35 if they 
choose for ad-hoc proceedings. The majority of BITs concluded, also provide access to 
arbitration under both ISCID and UNCITRAL Arbitration rules 36 . Although most BITs 
provide for arbitration under ISCID it is not uncommon for some agreements to refer to 
                                                          
26 Andrea K. Bjorklund, The Emerging Civilization of Investment Arbitration p.1289 
27 Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principals of International Investment Law p.27-28 
28 Jeffrey T. Cook, the evolution of investment state dispute resolution in NAFTA and CAFTA p. 1103 
29 NAFTA Article 1131 (2) 
30 Jack J. Coe, Jr., Transparency in the Resolution of Investor-State Disputes: Adoption, Adaptation and 
NAFTA Leadership p.1366 
31Jeffrey T. Cook. p.1107 
32 DR-CAFTA Articles 10.21.(1) and 10.21(2) 
33 NAFTA Article 1120 (1) 
34 Available at: https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf 
35 Available at: http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-revised/arb-rules-
revised-2010-e.pdf 
36 Cristoffer Nyegaard Mollestad See no Evil? Procedural Transparency in International Investment 
Law and Dispute Settlement p.37 
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different institutional rules such as the Arbitration Rules of the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC)37. 
From the arbitration rules that were most commonly used so far ICSID Rules were the 
only established exclusively for Investor-State disputes38  something that perhaps explains 
their popularity39. On the other hand the UNCITRAL Rules have been drafted for addressing 
primarily commercial arbitration disputes between two private parties 40 . It is thus not 
surprising that their transparency provisions are limited. The recently adopted UNCITRAL 
Rules on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State arbitration (UNCITRAL Rules on 
Transparency) however are expected to change the landscape in International Investment 
Arbitration and are indeed of particular interest. Pursuant to Article 1(1), “the rules on 
Transparency apply to investor State arbitration initiated under the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
rules pursuant to a treaty … concluded on or after the 1st of April 2014, unless the parties to 
the treaty have agreed otherwise”. However, according to 1(2), for Investor State arbitrations 
initiated pursuant to a treaty concluded before 1st of April 2014 there need to be an agreement 
of a) the disputing parties or b) the State Parties to the treaty after the 1st of April 2014 to their 
application. This may raise concerns that the scope of application will initially be very limited 
since the vast majority of BITs is concluded before this date. However the replacement of 
older investment treaties with newer ones will eventually limit the need for the parties to 
explicitly agree41. Furthermore, the recently adopted UNCITRAL convention on transparency 
in treaty-based investor-State arbitration aims to further extend the application of the 
UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency even for arbitrations conducted pursuant to a treaty 
concluded before 1st of April 201442. 
 
     The different forms of transparency 
In order to comprehend and distinguish all the different forms of transparency it is worth 
examining the various provisions of the most commonly used rules in investment arbitration 
during each stage of the arbitral proceedings. The need of the public to be informed of a 
dispute arises at the early stage of the initiation of arbitration proceedings. ICSID addresses 
the issue providing some basic information about its cases regarding the identification of the 
parties, date of registration, subject matter, constitution, and composition of the Tribunal on 
its website43. Furthermore, according to Article 36 (3) of the ISCID Convention, requests for 
arbitration shall be registered by the Secretary General  unless the dispute is manifestly 
                                                          
37 Eugenia Levine p.203 
38 ICSID convention Art.25 (1) 
39 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) IIA Issues Note Recent 
Developments in Investor State Dispute Settlement p.4 available at: 
http://unctad.org/en/publicationslibrary/webdiaepcb2014d3_en.pdf 
40 Lise Johnson and Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, New UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency : 
Application, Content, and Next Steps p.6 
41 Jan Heiner Nedden, Friedrich Rosenfeld p.48-49 
42 form the combined wording of Articles 1 and 2 of the UNCITRAL convention on transparency in 
treaty-based investor-State arbitration available at: 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/uncitral_texts/arbitration.html 
43Information available at: 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=ListConclude
d 
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outside the jurisdiction of the center and the registers shall be open for inspection by any 
person giving a public character to the to the ISCID case register 44. The ISCID register is an 
important feature of ICSID that provides a high level of transparency, compared to other 
arbitration regimes that do not provide any registry services at all45. The new UNCITRAL 
Transparency Rules also contain a provision on the commencement of arbitral proceedings, in 
Article 2: “Once the notice of arbitration has been received by the respondent, each of the 
disputing parties shall promptly communicate a copy of the notice of arbitration to the 
repository referred to under article 8 … the repository shall promptly make available to the 
public information regarding the name of the disputing parties, the economic sector involved 
and the treaty under which the claim is being made”. The provision which was the result of a 
compromise requires a prompt disclosure of some basic facts of the dispute and the limited 
scope of it was justified on the ground that a potential publication of the notice of arbitration 
itself before the constitution of the arbitral tribunal could create problems regarding issues of 
protected or confidential information 46 . Nevertheless, the introduction of registration 
mechanism is a significant step towards increased awareness for the disputes resolved under 
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.   
The next layer of transparency concerns the publication of documents that are used in the 
arbitral proceedings. The ICSID Arbitration rules are silent regarding the disclosure of 
documents during the written procedure47 . In the absence of relevant provisions arbitral 
tribunals have dealt with the issue in many cases. In the Biwater v United Republic of 
Tanzania case for example the tribunal tried to strike a balance between the notions of 
transparency and confidentiality, recognizing that “... there is no provision imposing a general 
duty of confidentiality in ISCID arbitration whether in the ICSID Convention, any of the 
applicable rules or otherwise. Equally, however there is no provision imposing a general duty 
of transparency or non-confidentiality in any of these sources”48. This statement was in line 
with a number of earlier decisions such as Amco, Metaclad, S. D. Myers and Loewen that 
denied the concept of an inherent confidentiality principal in treaty based arbitration 49 . 
Furthermore, the Biwater tribunal distinguished certain types of documents such as the 
minutes of the hearings, the pleadings by the parties and decisions of the tribunal other than 
the final award50. From this perspective, the tribunals decision was considered innovative 
since it contained a specifically tailored solution on how much document transparency 
seemed appropriate, based on the circumstances of the specific dispute51. It did conclude 
however, that in the absence of any agreement between them, the parties should refrain from 
disclosing to third parties these documents “which might undermine the procedural integrity 
… and/or might aggravate or exacerbate the dispute”52  considering that the risks of disrupting 
the procedural integrity of the process will frequently outweigh the interest of publication. 
The Biwater transparency approach was indeed influential on later tribunals although it has 
                                                          
44 ICSID Administrative Financial Regulations, regulation 23 (2) 
45 Cristoffer Nyegaard Mollestad p.80 
46Lise Johnson and Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder p.13 
47 See also ISCID Arbitration Rule 31 
48 Procedural order n.3 par.121 
49 Cristoffer Nyegaard Mollestad p.87-88 
50 Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v United Republic of Tanzania ICSID Case No ARB/05/22 Procedural 
order n.3 par.151-161 
51 Christina Knahr, August Reinisch, Transparency vs Confidentiality in International Investment 
Arbitartion  p.115-116 
52Procedural order no 3 par.163 
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been criticized for placing strict restrictions on the disclosure of documents and relying for its 
decision in the principal of “procedural integrity” without defining the term53. Hopefully 
however, it didn’t hold tribunals in a few cases to follow a more liberal approach on the issue 
of document transparency.54 
Similar to the ICSID rules, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules do not contain any specific 
provision on the publicity of documents. The UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency however, 
address the issue for the first time, establishing in Article 3, three distinct categories of 
documents 55 . The first category consists of documents that shall be made available 
irrespective of a request and includes documents such as “the notice of arbitration, the 
response to the notice of arbitration, the statements of claim and defense and any further 
written statements or written submissions by any disputing party … any written submissions 
by the non-disputing Party (or Parties) to the treaty and by third persons, transcripts of 
hearings … and most importantly orders, decisions and awards of the arbitral tribunal”. The 
second category involves documents that shall be made available to the public only upon a 
request by any person to the arbitral tribunal, namely “expert reports and witness statements, 
exclusive of the exhibits”. The last category leaves to the tribunal the discretion to decide “on 
its own initiative or upon request from any person, and after consultation with the disputing 
parties, whether and how to make available exhibits and any other documents provided to, or 
issued by, the arbitral tribunal” not falling within the first two categories. “This may include, 
for example, making such documents available at a specified site”. The new provision is 
certainly on the right direction granting access to a wide range of documents. It also provides 
the possibility for further transparency in case of investment treaties that go beyond the 
disclosure requirements of Article 3 pursuant to article 1(7) that expressly notes that in case 
any broader disclosure requirements in the governing treaty will prevail56 . 
Another crucial transparency aspect is the presence of persons other than the parties during 
the oral hearings. For many years the prevailing rule has been that of Art. 28 (3) of the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules according to which, hearings shall be held "in camera"(in 
chambers) unless the parties agree otherwise. ICSID Arbitration Rules contained a similar 
provision that was subject to the 2006 revision57. Thus the amended ICSID Arbitration Rule 
32(2), provides that unless either party objects, “the Tribunal, after consultation with the 
Secretary-General, may allow other persons, besides the parties … to attend or observe all or 
part of the hearings, subject to appropriate logistical arrangements. The Tribunal shall for 
such cases establish procedures for the protection of proprietary or privileged information”. 
Since the rules on the issue of publicity of the hearings are rather strict the tribunals in most 
cases respected the agreement of the parties to keep hearings private. According to the 
tribunal’s decision In Methanex case, “The phrase "in camera" is clearly intended to exclude 
members of the public, i.e. non-party third persons such as the Petitioners. … as a result of 
article 25 (4) 58, hearings are to be held in camera unless both parties consent otherwise. The 
Claimant has given no such content. The tribunal must therefore apply Article 25 (4) … it 
                                                          
53 Christina Knahr, August Reinisch p.106,Cristoffer Nyegaard Mollestad p.94-95 
54 See supra note 93 
55 Article 3(1),(2) and (3) respectively of the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency 
56 Lise Johnson and Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder p.15 
57 article 32, par.2 gave the tribunal the authority to decide the issue of non-party access to the 
hearings , but only with the consent of the parties  
58 now Article 28 (3) 
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follows that the tribunal must reject the petitioners request to attend oral hearings of the 
arbitration”59. Similarly tribunals denied the request of third parties to attend oral hearings in 
a number of subsequent cases60. Despite the fact that the provisions so far have left the matter 
to the discretion disputing parties creating a rather rigid system, recently there are notable 
steps towards a level of openness during the oral proceedings61. In 2010 Pac Rim LLC v 
Republic of El Salvador62 was the first case where the hearing was webcasted live giving the 
opportunity to the public to watch the proceedings in real-time on the basis of DR-CAFTA 
Article 10.21 (2) which provides for mandatory public hearings. The case was followed by a 
number of other Latin American cases63 that had their hearings webcasted creating a positive 
precedent. 
Furthermore, the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency also address the matter, providing in 
article 6 (1) that the hearings for the presentation of evidence or for oral argument shall be 
public subject to the two exceptions following in paragraphs 2 and 3 according to which 
“where there is a need to protect confidential information or the integrity of the arbitral 
process pursuant to article 7, the arbitral tribunal shall make arrangements to hold in private 
that part of the hearing requiring such protection and …, the arbitral tribunal may, after 
consultation with the disputing parties, decide to hold all or part of the hearings in private 
where this becomes necessary for logistical reasons, such as when the circumstances render 
any original arrangement for public access to a hearing infeasible”. It is thus evident that the 
new Rules approach to the publicity of oral proceedings is radically different form the “in 
camera” rule that has prevailed so far in most arbitration regimes64. As correctly argued, the 
opening of the physical proceedings can be beneficial for the overall legitimacy of the system 
since it signifies that neither the host State nor the tribunal has anything to hide something 
that will eventually be useful for the investor as well65 . Thus, despite the possibility of 
holding the hearings in private based on the exceptions of the provision, the new rule is 
certainly on the right direction.   
At the end of the arbitration proceedings comes the rendering of the award one of the 
procedural stages where transparency is mostly needed. ICSID may publish an award only 
when both parties give their consent, and publication is made either on the ICSID website66 or 
in ICSID Review -Foreign Investment Law Journal (FILJ)67 . More specifically, Article 48(5) 
of the ICSID Convention provides that: “The Centre shall not publish the award without the 
consent of the parties”. This prohibition, which is addressed to the Centre itself only, is 
                                                          
59 Methanex decision of the tribunal on petitions from third persons to intervene as amici curiae 
par.41-42 
60 Biwater procedural order no.5 par.69-72, Suez-Vivendi order in response to a petition for 
transparency and participation as amicus curiae par.4-7 
61 Cristoffer Nyegaard Mollestad p.103-104 
62 Pac Rim Cayman LLC v Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12 
63 see also, Railroad Development Corporation v. Republic of Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/23 
and Commerce Group Corp. and San Sebastian Gold Mines Inc. v the Republic of El Salvador, ICSID 
Case No. ARB /09/17 
64 see also ICC Rules Ar. 26 (3) 
65 Jack J. Coe, Jr. p.1361 
66Information available at: 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&reqFrom=Main&actionVal=On
lineAward 
67 Rodrigo Polanco Lazo, International Arbitartion in Times of Change: Fairness and Transparency in 
Investor State Disputes p.594 
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repeated in Rule 48(4) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules and extends to ICSID arbitrators 
through declarations of confidentiality as provided for in Rule 6(2) of the ICSID Arbitration 
Rules 68 . Under Article 34(5) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, an award may be 
publicized “only with the consent of the parties” as well. The same confidentiality 
requirement constrains parties under other institutional rules of arbitration 69 . In practice, 
despite the ever increasing pressure for transparency and the institutional reform towards this 
direction, there is a large percentage of cases where the parties choose not to disclose the 
outcome70 . 
The UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency rules going much further include the awards at 
the first category of documents. Thus, awards under the provision of Article 3(1) should be 
made available to the public subject to the exception of Article 7. The significance of the new 
provision becomes evident by examining the perceived advantages. Publicity of final awards 
contributes to the development of predictability for both States and Investors by establishing a 
body of case law and at the same time satisfies public interest by making available the 
outcome of the dispute resolution.  Greater publication of awards is the best way to increase 
popular acceptance and the overall legitimacy of the arbitration system71 . Publication of 
awards also prevents inconsistent judgments that may be rare but when they do occur they 
raise doubts about the reliability and the authority of the entire arbitral system 72 . As 
successfully put “much of the of the value of the doctrine of the rule of law lies in consistency 
… Social and economic stability, as well as respect for the law requires that parties have the 
ability to know the likely legal consequences of what they do in advance, at the time they act” 
73. 
 
     Amicus curiae 
In investor-State disputes, it has been increasingly common for third or non-disputing 
parties to ask to participate in the arbitration proceedings as “amici curiae”, a Latin term that 
could be broadly translated as "friend of the court"74 . Generally speaking, the basis on which 
amicus curiae participation is justified, is that these friends of the court are in a position to 
provide the court or tribunal their special perspective or expertise in relation to the dispute, 
the arbitral process could benefit from being perceived as more open or transparent and the 
proceedings they are interested in participating to, concern issues of public interest75.   
 
 
                                                          
68 Christina Knahr, August.Reinisch p.99 
69 Permanent Court of Arbitration Rules (PCA) 34(5), London Court of International Arbitration Rules 
(LCIA) 30,Stockholm Chamber of Commerce Rules (SCC) 46 
70 Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Zachary C Steinert-Threlkeld  and David G. Victor p.4-5 
71 Joshua D. H. Karton, a conflict of interests-seeking a way forward on publication of international 
arbitral  awards p. 472 
72 Ibid. p.465 
73 Ibid. p.461 quotation from D.A. Ridgeway  
74 Eugenia Levine p.206-207 
75 Boris Kasolowsky and Natalie Harvey, Amici Curiae in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Authority and 
Procedural Fairness p.1 
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     The provisions that allow amicus participation 
Historically, amici curiae asked to intervene in State court proceedings through written 
submissions. These “amicus submissions” aim to assist the court by broadening its 
perspective on controversial issues and providing relevant information on the dispute76. In 
investment arbitration however, the issue of amicus curiae submissions was not addressed in 
early institutional rules. In the absence of any specific provisions, arbitral tribunals have 
interpreted their powers to encompass the authority to allow amicus submissions under 
certain conditions; Methanex became the first case in which the arbitral tribunal allowed four 
petitioners to file written submissions as amici curiae77. The tribunal based its decision on the 
discretion provided in article 15 (1)78 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules79 which “grants 
the arbitral tribunal broad discretion as to the manner in which arbitration proceedings are 
going to be conducted and is intended to provide the broadest procedural flexibility within 
fundamental safeguards”80. Similarly the tribunal in the UPS case found it had authority to 
receive amicus briefs pursuant to article 15 (1)81. A few years later, in the Suez-Vivendi 
Arbitration  the ICISID tribunal held that it “it can exercise its powers under Article 44 (of the 
ISCID Convention) in such a way to minimize the additional burden on both parties … the 
tribunal unanimously concludes that article 44 grants it the power to admit amicus curiae 
submissions from suitable nonparties in appropriate cases”82  
Since 10 April 2006, the amended ICSID Arbitration Rules 83  have explicitly given 
tribunals the power to allow for submissions of non-disputing parties. Thus, according to 
ICSID Arbitration rule 37(2): “After consulting both parties, the Tribunal may allow a person 
or entity that is not a party to the dispute … to file a written submission with the Tribunal 
regarding a matter within the scope of the dispute. In determining whether to allow such a 
filing, the Tribunal shall consider, among other things, the extent to which: 
(a) the non-disputing party submission would assist the Tribunal in the determination of a factual or 
legal issue related to the proceeding by bringing a perspective, particular knowledge or insight that is 
different from that of the disputing parties; 
(b) the non-disputing party submission would address a matter within the scope of the dispute; 
(c) the non-disputing party has a significant interest in the proceeding. The tribunal shall also ensure 
that the non-disputing party submission does not disrupt the proceeding or unduly burden or unfairly 
prejudice either party, and that both parties are given an opportunity to present their observations on the 
non-disputing party submission.” 
                                                          
76 Katia Fach Gómez p.516-517 
77 Epaminontas E.Triantafilou p.39 
78 now Article 17(1) 
79 Methanex decision of the tribunal on petitions of third parties to intervene as Amici curiae of 15 
January 2001 par.53 
80 Ibid. par.26-27  
81 UPS V Canada decision on Petitions for Intervention and Participation as Amici Curiae of 17 October 
2001 
82 Suez-Vivendi Order in Response to a Petition for Transparency and Participation as Amicus Curiae of 
May 19, 2005 par. 15-16 
83 See also the NAFTA Free Trade Commission(FTC) Statement on non-disputing party participation, 7 
October 2003 
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Rule 37 (2) has been relied in a number of cases including the influential Biwater dispute. 
In its decision, the tribunal accepted the petitioners’ submissions noting “that it may benefit 
from a written submission by the Petitioners, and that allowing for the making of such 
submission by these entities in these proceedings is an important element in the overall 
discharge of the Arbitral Tribunal's mandate, and in securing wider confidence in the arbitral 
process itself”84. 
The new UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency could not omit the inclusion of an amicus 
provision. Thus according to Article 4(3) “the arbitral tribunal in determining whether to 
allow such a submission such consider among other factors:  
(a)  Whether the third person has a significant interest in the arbitral proceedings; and 
(b) The extent to which the submission would assist the arbitral tribunal in the determination of a 
factual or legal issue related to the arbitral proceedings by bringing a perspective, particular knowledge 
or insight that is different from that of the disputing parties”  
Based on the wording of both texts, the requirement of a “significant interest” of the third 
person in the arbitral proceedings is of particular importance especially in relation to the 
general concept of public interest which surprisingly is not included as condition to accept 
amicus submissions85. Of course as held in many cases, the public interest that is entailed in a 
dispute suffices to justify third party participation in the form of amicus submissions. 
Traditionally petitioners in most investment disputes, where non-local actors most commonly 
Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) that have been interested in certain general topics 
such as environmental protection, business and human rights without being related to any 
specific community86.  
However this does not prevent, local or regional actors that may represent those who are 
directly affected by the dispute, but they are not primarily intended to extend the objectives of 
public interest elsewhere to file amicus submissions. Thus for these petitioners the 
requirement of a significant interest is essential 87 . A number of cases highlight this 
diversification of entities that are granted amicus curiae status.  For example, in the NAFTA 
dispute Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States of America the tribunal expanded the scope of third 
party participation beyond civil society groups. Although the tribunal did not allow any third 
parties to actively participate in the case the Quechan Indian Nation appeared to have 
represented a more concrete interest in the outcome of the proceedings than the NGOs that 
had intervened in previous disputes88 leading the tribunal to accept its submission89. The trend 
was also confirmed in the recent ISCID cases AES and Electrabel vs Hungary, where the 
                                                          
84 Biwater procedural order no5 par.50 
85 although the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency rules provide in Art 1.4 that “arbitral tribunals shall 
exercise their discretionary powers while taking into account a) The public interest in transparency in 
treaty-based investor-State arbitration and in the particular arbitral proceedings; and b)The disputing 
parties’ interest in a fair and efficient resolution of their dispute” 
86 Christian Schlieman, Requirements for Amicus Curiae Participation in International Investment 
Arbitartion p. 374 
87 Ibid. 
88 Eugenia Levine p. 213 
89 Glamis Gold Ltd. v the United States of America decision on application and submission by Quechan 
Indian Nation, September 16 2005  par.13 
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arbitral tribunals allowed the European Commission to file written submissions 90 on the basis 
of enforcement of EU competition due “to alleged breaches by Hungary of commitments 
contained in long term power purchase agreements (PPAs) between AES and Electrabel and a 
Hungarian entity…”91.  
Amicus submissions have been increasingly popular since they became accepted in many 
investment cases by arbitral tribunals something that is also reflected in the amendment of the 
main institutional Rules. However, despite the increased tolerance the quantity and 
particularly the quality of amicus participation had been limited. First of all, there is a 
significant number of requests to participate as amici curiae that have been outright rejected92. 
Most importantly, despite the relative success in accepting amicus submissions other aspects 
of third party participation are significantly underdeveloped. For example the revision of the 
ICSID Arbitration Rules which introduced Rule 37(2), did not deal with the amicus curiae’s 
access to procedural documents. Therefore, in most cases tribunals following a similar 
approach to general document transparency appeared negative towards the relevant requests 
by third parties. In Suez-Vivendi, the tribunal held that as a general proposition, an amicus 
curiae must have sufficient information on the subject matter of the dispute to provide 
“perspectives, expertise and arguments” which are pertinent and thus likely to be of assistance 
to the Tribunal ... a function that they can fully carry out without access to the record93. 
Similarly in Biwater the tribunal denied the application for access to documents94, adhered to 
the arguments of the first procedural order. The exceptions to this overall trend where quite 
limited. In the case Piero Foresti v. South Africa the amici were allowed not only to file 
written submissions but also to have access to key case materials95. This example however 
does not characterize the general situation in regard to transparency. On the positive side, the 
new UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency along with a possible further revision of the ISCID 
rules will create a suitable framework for tribunals to adopt a more flexible conduct towards 
third party participation during all parts of the arbitral proceedings. 
 
      
     Some concerns about transparency in international investment arbitration   
It can be concluded that transparency in International investment arbitration is generally a 
good thing for the public. Broadly speaking, the main argument would be that it eases 
concerns on disputes that involve public interest because of their very nature. Furthermore, it 
dispels public fear about the secretive nature of arbitration by enhancing the overall 
                                                          
90 AES Summit Generation Limited & Another v.Republic of Hungary, ICSID case No. ARB/07/22, 
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91 Ibid. supra note 62 
92 Lucas Bastin, Amici Curiae in Investor-State Arbitration: Eight recent trends p.9-10 
93 Suez-Vivendi order in response to a petition by five non-governmental organizations for permission 
to make amicus curiae submission 12 February 2007  par.24-25 
94 Biwater procedural order no5 par 66-68 
95 Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli and others v. Republic of South Africa ISCID Case No ARB(AF)/07/01 
Letter from ISCID regarding non-disputing parties, 5 October 2009 
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legitimacy of the arbitration system96. Third party participation can also assist the arbitral 
tribunal in resolving the dispute since interested third parties can provide their knowledge, 
expertise or different perspective to the matter in question97. In the long term, it can even 
prove beneficial for the economy of the host state; promoting the public’s confidence in a 
system that handle’s rather costly disputes by making investor-State proceedings accessible to 
the public improves the country’s international reputation and eventually makes it desirable 
for foreign investments98. 
There are however considerable disadvantages especially for the side of investors as 
parties to a dispute. On a practical level it is argued that there are justifiable concerns on the 
increase of costs and delays of the arbitration process that may prove damaging for the parties 
to the dispute 99 . Moreover transparency contradicts with the traditional foundations of 
arbitration such as the consensual nature of arbitration and most importantly the principals of 
privacy and confidentiality. Confidentiality in particular, is considered to be one of the 
hallmarks of arbitration and among the main reasons why private parties choose commercial 
arbitration instead of state court proceedings100. This is due to the fact that companies prefer 
to protect their business secrets and public image from possible facts revealed to the general 
public in the litigation proceedings that could prove harmful101 . As a consequence most 
commercial arbitration rules contain provisions protecting the confidential nature of the 
proceedings that may range from broad confidentiality obligations to more restrictive 
provisions102. For example, according to Article 22.3 of the ICC Arbitration Rules “upon the 
request of any party, the arbitral tribunal may make orders concerning the confidentiality of 
the arbitration proceedings … and may take measures for protecting trade secrets and 
confidential information”. Privacy which concerns the exclusion of third parties from the 
hearings is also the default rule under the majority of institutional rules in commercial 
arbitration103.  
 It could be argued that most of the advantages of confidentiality such as the protection of 
business secrets as well as governmental secrets are equally applicable to investor-State 
arbitration 104 . Furthermore according to many commentators, confidentiality during 
proceedings could contribute to the de-politicization of investment disputes, and it might 
equally increase the possibility of a dispute settlement between the investor and the host-
State, promoting the establishment of a long-term relationship which negative publicity could 
damage105. So why do we have to allow increased transparency in investor-State disputes 
since the investors interests are undermined? Of course a simple answer to that question 
would be that transparency is necessary because of the public interest that investment disputes 
involve with all the advantages that stem form it for society and the arbitration system itself. 
However the answer to that question is not that easy. As successfully put “Confidentiality and 
                                                          
96 Kyla Tienhaara, Third Party Participation in Investment-Environment Issues: Recent Developments 
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97 Ibid. 
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transparency are competing values which need to be accommodated and adjusted one to the 
other in specific cases”106. As seen in detail above arbitral tribunals have tried to keep the 
same distance from the two values. Although they did recognize “an overall trend in this field 
towards transparency”107, they came in most cases in restrictive decisions. Therefore, even 
though the overall advantages of transparency outweigh those of confidentiality, it is difficult 
if not impossible to achieve a perfectly balanced situation where both principals will be of 
equal gravity. After all, it is part of the arbitrators’ difficult task to assess the values that they 
should give priority to in each individual case, based on the particular legal and factual 
background.  
 
     III Transparency under CETA and TTIP 
 
     CETA and TTIP the new framework in International Investment Arbitration 
As aforementioned, bilateral and multilateral investment treaties are the cornerstone of the 
international investment arbitration system. In a European level however, EU member States 
are no longer able to conclude investment treaties whether BITs or FTAs with third countries 
since the treaty of Lisbon108 transferred, the competence for concluding agreements relating to 
foreign investment to the European Union. Within this new framework the EU initiated 
negotiations on the two most ambitious free trade and investment agreements it has ever enter 
into, the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) and the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with two of the most advanced economies in the 
world, Canada and the US respectively. The significance of both agreements is evident by 
looking at the figures of these economies. The EU and US together account for over half of 
the words Gross Domestic Product109 while the EU’s overall trade in goods and services with 
the US has reached the amount of EUR 800 billion and with Canada that of EUR 88 billion110. 
Both agreements will be of immense size and like other FTAs they will primarily include 
provisions on trade with protection of investment being addressed in specific chapters. 
CETA: By October 2014, negotiations on the CETA, have came to an end after 5-year talks 
between Canada and the EU111. CETA will cover a broad range of trade issues including tariff 
elimination in industrial and agricultural products, prohibitions on export duties, rules on 
product origin, liberalization of services and investment, government procurement, 
intellectual property rights e.t.c.112 . Regarding investment provisions in particular according 
to its drafters, CETA introduces important innovations, ensuring a high level of investment 
protection while preserving the EU and Canada’s right to regulate on significant issues of 
                                                          
106 Florentino P. Feliciano quoted in Cristoffer Nyegaard Mollestad p.85 
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public policy, such as the protection of health, safety or the environment113. Thus, CETA is 
expected to present clearer and more precise investment protection standards including the 
rules that the arbitration tribunals will apply and new rules on the conduct of procedures in 
arbitration tribunals114.  
TTIP: Unlike CETA, negotiations on the TTIP are still under way with both parties intention 
to reach an agreement within the next few years covering many parts of the economy 
including manufacture, services and agriculture115. According to the negotiators, the main 
goal of TTIP is to increase economic growth by removing trade barriers in order to boost and 
facilitate the buying and selling of goods and services as well as the investment is these two 
major economies116. The three main elements of TTIP are the improvement of market access, 
by removing custom duties on goods and restrictions on services; improved regulatory 
coherence and cooperation by dismantling regulatory and bureaucratic barriers and improved 
cooperation on setting international standards117 . In regard to investment provisions, similarly 
to the CETA approach TTIP is expected to introduce innovative provisions that clarify the 
meaning of the main investment protection standards such as fair and equitable treatment and 
indirect expropriation118. 
 
    The criticism  
Both CETA and TTIP are without doubt ambitious agreements with far reaching 
consequences for the economies of the State-parties but also for their citizens. From the 
beginning of the negotiating process, mounting criticism and concerns have been raised by 
various social and economic actors including civil society groups, private industry 
representatives even government officials119.  At this point however, there should be a clear 
distinction. While part of the criticism focuses on the lack of transparency during the stage of 
the negotiations the main source of concern relates to  the substantive provisions of both texts 
and in particular the inclusion or not of an Investor to State Dispute Settlement mechanism 
(ISDS). Then the problem of how much level of transparency will exist during the arbitration 
proceedings arises, since the presence of an ISDS system is obviously the main reason why 
transparency is needed after all. Each of these issues is of particular significance with a vast 
number of arguments and counter arguments from both the side of the drafters and that of the 
critics that will be briefly examined. 
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     Transparency during the negotiations 
The stage of the negotiations for both agreements has become subject to strong public 
scrutiny and raised a significant level of concern. Although negotiations on CETA have come 
to an end, accusations of poor transparency towards EU and Canadian officials have shown 
that making some basic information available is not sufficient to ease the public’s concern 
something that is particularly evident in TTIP’s negotiations which are currently under 
way120. Despite the efforts from Brussels to raise awareness of the new agreement, since the 
beginning of TTIP tacks, The European Commission has received strong criticism for the lack 
of transparency during the negotiations by a considerable number of civil society groups and 
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). Concerns which have been raised relate to the 
non-disclosure of negotiation documents and positions to the public, the limited access to 
negotiation documents provided to Parliaments and EU member states as well as the 
excessive secrecy around meetings in which TTIP was discussed, with persons that are 
characterized as lobbyists121. In response to that criticism, the EU Commission has promised 
to take additional transparency measures such as more extensive access to TTIP documents 
by making available all the negotiating texts that the commissions shares with Member states 
and the Parliament as well as common negotiating documents with the explicit agreement of 
the US122. It also committed for further transparency measures such as, a revision of the 
classification of trade information, provision of broad access to MEPs, e.t.c. 123 
 
     ISDS concerns 
Investor State Dispute Settlement is nothing more than the legal instrument that allows a 
foreign investor to bring claims before an arbitral tribunal and not in front of the national 
courts of the state hosting the investment, compromising the standard feature of all the 3.000 
investment agreements that currently exist124. As earlier noted, Investment arbitration has 
always been the source of considerable public concern. Thus it is not surprising, that the ISDS 
mechanism envisaged to be included in TTIP has already triggered an intense public debate 
since Several NGOs and parties of national Parliaments have questioned the need for 
including an investment protection chapter with ISDS rules in the TTIP125. Similarly CETA 
which already includes an ISDS mechanism has been strongly criticized by NGOs and 
commentators for giving to investors the opportunity to bypass domestic courts and address 
directly to arbitral tribunals for disputes that concern health, environmental and financial 
issues that should be domestically safeguarded126. Concerns about the democratic legitimacy 
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of the system are once again at the center of the public dialogue. Thus opponents argue that 
with investor-State arbitration, the arbitrators have the power to decide what a sovereign state 
should do and what should be the consequences if it is found to have acted unlawfully127 
something that they deem inacceptable in agreements with the significance of CETA and 
TTIP. Another recent argument against investment arbitration is that ISDS prevents 
governments from exercising their sovereignty in fear of costly investment arbitration awards 
causing a “regulatory chill”128. On the other hand, according to the EU, an ISDS system is 
necessary to protect investors against unlawful expropriation by governments since even in 
countries with strong legal systems it is possible that foreign investors will not be adequately 
protected129.  
 
     Transparency in the arbitration proceedings 
The dispute over the inclusion or not of ISDS is fundamental, it goes however beyond the 
scope of this analysis since it requires a thorough examination of all the advantages and 
disadvantages of both investment arbitration and State court proceedings. Instead it would be 
more relevant to focus on the available provisions that will guarantee transparency in the 
arbitration proceedings, assuming that both CETA and TTIP will eventually be ratified 
without any crucial changes especially regarding the inclusion of an ISDS mechanism. In the 
consolidated CETA text 130  transparency in ISDS proceedings is safeguarded with the 
incorporation of the UNCITRAL Transparency rules131 which indeed provide for an enhanced 
transparency in all levels of the arbitral proceedings. On the other hand TTIPs provisions are 
not yet available to the public. The commission did however promise to take a positive 
approach towards transparency in TTIP ISDS system. Recognizing the importance of 
transparency it ensures that in ISDS cases brought under TTIP, all documents will be publicly 
available, hearings will be open to the public and interested parties from civil society groups 
will be able to file amicus submissions in order to make their views and arguments known to 
the ISDS tribunal132. The commission taking a step forward has also expressed the intention to 
include the UNCITRAL Transparency rules into TTIP as well133. Therefore, since so far only 
CETA provisions have leaked to the public, it is worth examining their main features in 
relation to the UNCITRAL Transparency rules (Rules on Transparency) that are expected to 
play a key role in both agreements. 
Regarding the scope of application, CETA Article X33 (1) provides that “the UNCITRAL 
Transparency Rules shall apply to the disclosure of information to the public concerning 
disputes under this Section (Section 6. Investor-State Dispute Settlement) as modified by this 
Chapter (Chapter 10. Investment)”. This seems to include not only arbitration initiated under 
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the UNCITRAL Arbitration rules but also other institutional rules or ad-hoc proceedings134 
since the proposed text gives the possibility to the parties to submit a claim under the 
arbitration rules of the ISCID convention or any other rules on agreement of the disputing 
parties135. The draft provisions provide for an extensive transparency in all stages of the 
arbitral proceedings that surpass in some aspects even the UNCITRAL Rules on 
Transparency. First of all, CETA gives the possibility of disclosure of information at a stage 
prior to the constitution of the arbitral tribunal. Thus according to Article X33 (4) Canada or 
the European Union depending on the case, “shall make publicly available in a timely manner 
relevant documents … subject to the exception of confidential or protected information. Such 
documents may be available by communication to the repository”. Furthermore the proposed 
CETA Provision of Article x33 (2) requires an extensive disclosure of procedural documents 
that is even broader from the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, since “the request for 
consultations, the notice requesting a determination of the respondent, the notice of 
determination of the respondent, the agreement to mediate, the notice of intent to challenge, 
the decision on an arbitrator challenge and the request for consolidation” are included in the 
first category of documents136. It also provides that “Exhibits shall be included in the list of 
documents mentioned in Article 3(2) of the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules X33 (3)”. 
Finally, the CETA transparency provision in paragraph 5 also adopts the approach of hearings 
open to the public subject to the logistical arrangements exception and the protection of 
confidential or protected information137.  
In addition, according to paragraph 6 of Article X33: “Nothing in this Chapter requires a 
respondent to withhold from the public information required to be disclosed by its laws (the 
law of the respondent State). The respondent should endeavor to apply such laws in a manner 
sensitive to protecting from disclosure information that has been designated as confidential or 
protected”. In the absence of any further details on what information could be considered 
protected or confidential, tribunals will most likely apply Article 7(2) of the UNCITRAL 
Rules on Transparency, which includes four potentially overlapping categories of information 
that are characterized as confidential or protected, namely:  
 
(a)  Confidential business information;  
 
(b)  Information that is protected against being made available to the public under the treaty;  
(c)  Information that is protected against being made available to the public, in the case of the 
information of the respondent State, under the law of the respondent State, and in the case of other 
information, under any law or rules determined by the arbitral tribunal to be applicable to the disclosure 
of such information; or  
(d)  Information the disclosure of which would impede law enforcement 
Whether and what information will fall under the exceptions will be an issue to be decided 
on a case-by-case basis based on the nature of the information and the applicable law138. The 
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rules also leave it up to the tribunal to determine how parties and non parties should proceed 
when designating information as confidential or protected139. Due to this wide margin of 
discretion, commentators are concerned that some of these exceptions especially this of 
“confidential or business information” will be often invoked in practice although they are not 
clearly defined by the provisions140. The same could be said about the other exceptions of 
article 7141 which although are not included in CETA X33 (6) it is possible that they will be a 
source of uncertainty as part of the general application of the UNCITRAL Rules on 
Transparency in CETA and TTIP. For instance Article 7(5) stipulates that  “Nothing in these 
Rules requires a respondent State (the EU or the US) to make available to the public 
information the disclosure of which it considers to be contrary to its essential security 
interests” without however making clear who and how will strike the balance between 
national security interests and transparency. 
Furthermore, concerns can be raised about paragraph (6) of the same article, since it 
provides a further exception : “Information shall not be made available to the public … where 
the information, if made available to the public, would jeopardize the integrity of the arbitral 
process as determined pursuant to paragraph 7” which holds that “the arbitral tribunal may, on 
its own initiative or upon the application of a disputing party … take appropriate measures to 
restrain or delay the publication of information where such publication would jeopardize the 
integrity of the arbitral process because it could hamper the collection or production of 
evidence, lead to the intimidation of witnesses, lawyers acting for disputing parties or 
members of the arbitral tribunal, or in comparably exceptional circumstances”. It is argued 
that Article 7(7) of the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency would allow ISDS arbitrators to 
apply analogy to enlarge the list of exceptions contained therein based on the expression “or 
in comparably exceptional circumstances”. Therefore according to critics, the expression 
should be excluded from possible application by the drafters142 . These concerns can be 
justified to a large extent since some of the exceptions are based on notions that are not 
clearly defined and could be often invoked during the proceedings by the parties to the 
dispute, third persons or even by the arbitral tribunal “proprio motu”, without ever having 
being invoked by the parties143. After all, it should be acknowledged, that the Biwater tribunal 
received strong criticism for placing strict restrictions to document transparency based on the 
vague notions of “procedural integrity” and “non aggravation non exacerbation of the 
dispute” 144.These considerations should be taken into account form the drafters of CETA and 
TTIP in order to succeed in concluding two trade and investment agreements that will ensure 
maximum transparency in the proceedings while safeguarding a level of protection for 
investors. 
 
      
      
                                                          
139 Ibid. 
140 Christian Tietje, Freya Baetens p.107 
141 Particularly these of Article 7(5), 7(6), 7(7) UNCITRAL Rules on Trabsparency 
142 European Digital Rights response to ISDS consultation p10-11 available at : http://eu-
secretdeals.info/upload/2014/07/EDRi_response_ISDS_Consultation.pdf 
143 Christian Tietje, Freya Baetens p.108 
144 See supra note 49 
 
 
22 
 
     IV Conclusion 
It is beyond any doubt, that in the field of the international investment system the 
transparency movement has gained increasing popularity and has indeed been successful in 
some key issues. NGOs and civil society groups have achieved more participation rights in 
international investment arbitration proceedings especially in the form of acceptance of 
amicus curiae submissions something that is reflected in the amendment of ISCID Arbitration 
Rules, the adoption of the new UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency as well as a growing body 
of case law. Most analysts however agree that the level of third party participation in the 
proceedings is still limited. Document transparency is relatively restricted and most hearings 
are held in private although recent efforts show signs of improvement.  
The most breathtaking shift however in regard to the normative framework of international 
investment arbitration, is going to take place with the first two agreements that the EU is 
going to conclude as an entity with two other developed nations. Indeed, both CETA and 
TTIP are two colossal FTAs that are going to affect trade between their State-parties in a 
profound way. Thus, at some level it is justifiable for the public to be concerned about the 
lack of openness during the negotiations as well as the possible consequences of their 
substantive provisions after their conclusion. The debate is still raging especially in relation to 
the ISDS system that the drafters intent to include, with civil society groups, national 
governments and private actors having strong arguments for and against it. Things however 
should be seen from the right perspective. The drafters should take all this criticism into 
account. Opponents on the other hand should among other things consider that in case of an 
ISDS mechanism, the treaties will provide for maximum transparency based on the most 
liberal provisions existing so far in the field, the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency. In any 
case, whether or not there will be a compromise is yet to be seen as there is a long way before 
the new treaties are ratified. After all, what is important for a free trade agreement is to 
achieve its goal which is to increase trade and foreign investment something that will be also 
proved in the nearby future. 
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